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INTEREST RATES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA:  







High nominal and real interest rates are one of the main features, but 
also one of the main problems, of the stabilization process in the 
Republic of Croatia. Indeed, the growth of interest rates over the past 
few months calls for the systematic consideration of the problem. 
However, all its aspects can only be analyzed in conjunction with the 
overall monetary policy and development of financial markets. This is 
the subject of the present paper. 
The first part deals with statistical facts. The second part discusses the 
causes of high interest rates, and the third presents the conclusions. 
 
1. WHAT DO STATISTICAL DATA SHOW? 
 
1.1. Weighted Average Lending and Deposit Interest Rates in 
Commercial Banks 
 
Nominal rates are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Monthly rates have 
been used divided into two periods: from December 1992 to March 
1994, and from April 1994 to July 1995. The division into periods has 
been done for the purpose of better surveyability. In the interpretation 
of data it should be borne in mind that the trend of the total average 
interest rate is strongly influenced by the short-term interest rate 
because a long-term loan market practically does not exist in Croatia. 
 
The figures illustrate a decline of the average nominal rate after 
inflation was brought down. The decline lasted until August 1994, when 




                                                          
1 Data on interest deposit for July and August are not comparable with the previous 
figures. 
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Since nominal interest rates declined as high inflation was brought 
down, the difference between lending and deposit interest rates 
(referred to as margin) underwent major changes. Until 1993 the 
margin reached, on the average, 15 percent at the monthly or 435 
percent at the yearly level; after the curbing of inflation it stabilized at 
about 1 percent a month or 12.7 percent a year. However, this year the 
margin has obviously been increasing and currently - observed in terms 
of the difference between the average weighted interest on kung loans 
and deposits - amounts to about 17.5 percent. 
 
However, these figures do not reflect the real cost of capital. In deposit 
money banks the cost is higher by several percentage points at the 
yearly level because of various fees paid when loans are granted. 
Moreover, credit flows between the banks and their clients represent 
only a part of overall credit flows. The second part refers to credit 
relations between enterprises, and credit relations between other 
financial organizations (savings banks, savings&credit associations etc.) 
and their clients. Although there are no reliable statistical data on this 
segment of the credit market, partial information suggest its three main 
features: 
a) interest rate levels are 1-6 percent a month or 13-100 percent a 
year; 
b) the market is pronouncedly segmented, which means that the 
variation of the cost of capital is very high and very dependent 
on the amount of the granted loan, and on the nature of the 
business relation between the lender and the borrower; 
c) the financial instruments in the market are very primitive, 
meaning that, as a rule, they involve ordinary contracts with a 
clause on the protection of the value of principal (rate of 
exchange or a price index), while the nature and the value of 
the collateral are determined entirely arbitrarily depending on 
the preferences of the parties to the contract. 
 
 50
In terms of its magnitude, this market probably lags behind the banking 
loan market, and the continuation of this paper is therefore devoted to 
the analysis of the most important segment of the loan market - the 
segment involving banks and their clients. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the trend of real interest rates applied by deposit 
money banks at the monthly level. Retail prices have been used as a 
deflator. 
 
The Figure can be split into three periods. The first is the period of high 
inflation up to September 1993. Although real lending interest rates 
were occasionally positive in that period because of unforseeable price 
fluctuations (having even reached the prohibitively high real level of 6.6 
and 5 percent a month in December 1992 and April 1993, respectively), 
the salient feature of the period is the extremely high real margin which 
amounted to about 10 a month or 214 percent a year. Obviously, over 
the period under observation the deposit interest rates of deposit 
money banks were negative in real terms: the average for the first nine 
months was -9.2 percent a month, or about -200 percent a year.2 
 
                                                          
2 Calculation based on the absolute value. 
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The second period covers the first stage of the Stabilization Program 
from October 1993 to April 1994. The main features of the period, after 
the October stabilization shock, are as follows: 
a) real monthly lending interest rates at the 3-5 percent level; 
b) real monthly deposit interest rates became positive atthe 1-2.5 
percent level; 
c) the real interest rate margin dropped to the still high 2-3 
percent. 
 
After April 1994 the cost of capital stabilized at average levels slightly 
higher than 1 percent with a real interest margin of about 1 percent. 
Such a state of affairs prevailed until May 1995, when interest rates 
began to grow faster. This will be discussed at greater length in the 
second part of the Paper. 
 
1.2. Breakdown of Interest Rates by Financial Relation 
 
Table 1 reviews the breakdown of interest rates by type of financial 
relation for July. Although data for one month only are involved, the 
breakdown is representative for the entire period. It should be noted 
that the data shown in the Table have been collected in accordance 
with a new statistical methodology which makes data on interest paid 
incomparable with the data presented in Figures. However, this makes 
the data more reliable, and the comparison of lending and deposit 
interest rates more meaningful, because their statistical features are 
the same. The interest rates refer to both loans and deposits granted 
and/or collected in the current month. 
 
We thought it necessary to highlight the following characteristics of the 
interest rate breakdown: 
1. Interest rates on kung loans with and without the currency 
clause do not differ substantially. 
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2. The amount of foreign exchange loans as compared with kung 
loans is negligibly low, and the average rate of interest is lower 
by about 4 percent. 
3. Very high interest is paid on discounting securities, which 
suggests the high level of the risk premium. 
4. Long-term loans account for only 5 percent of overall kuna 
loans. 
5. The rate of interest on long-term loans is lower than the rate on 
short-term loans, which may be explained by two factors: (a) 
the part invested with enterprises probably involves foreign 
credit tines, which also means an interest rate closer to the 
international level; (b) the greatest part relates to loans to 
private persons, and some banks are just beginning to capture, 
by a lower cost of capital, this segment of the market whose 
purchasing power is still relatively low. 
6. Deposit interest rate on time kuna deposits is still higher than 
interest rates on time foreign exchange deposits, and interest 
rates on all time arrangements in kung are higher than interest 
rates on demand deposits in kung more than is customary in 
the world, which reflects the still present long-term distrust in 
the financial system. 
7. There are no long-term sources of funds (deposits) in Croatia. 
Demand and time deposits (up to one year) account for 99.8 
percent of kung and 98.3 percent of foreign exchange deposits. 
This means that the difference of interest rates is still too low to 
offset the feeling of risk and motivate depositors for long-term 
kung savings. The risk may also be broadly quantified as 
follows. Foreign exchange deposits do not comprise a foreign 
exchange but only systemic risk. The rate of interest on time 
foreign exchange deposits up to 1 year is still by 2-3 percent 
higher than in Austria or Germany. The difference reflects 
systemic risk and transaction costs. This percentage should be 
increased by the difference between interest rates on time 
deposits up to one year in kuna (12.33 percent) and foreign 
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exchange (6.67 percent). The 5.66 percent difference is the 
measure of currency risk. The sum of the systemic risk and 
currency risk is 8.66 percent (3% systemic + 5.66 percent 
foreign exchange). This is the premium Croatian banks are 
prepared to offer on the average at the yearly level, but it still 






1.3. Breakdown of Interest Rate by Bank Type 
 
The mentioned premium of 8.66 percent at the yearly level is the 
maximum that domestic banks can offer. Since this is not enough to 
attract higher kuna savings, the financial system is in a vicious circle. A 
higher premium would be required to attract capital, but deposit money 
banks are not capable of offering higher deposit rates because they 
could not bear the cost if that implied the reduction of the difference 
between lending and deposit interest. 
 
This observation introduces us to the problem of the cost and client 
structure of domestic deposit money banks. Namely, the widespread 
opinion is that poorer banks have higher costs and higher margins, and 
higher lending interest rates. It is generally being assumed that poorer 
banks operate with poorer clients affected by business crises, prepared 
to pay any interest just in order to extent their existence for a short 
term, and disregarding the payment of the principal in the future. Our 
studies have shown that such a belief is wrong. 
 
A representative sample of 10 deposit money banks has been analyzed. 
The sample includes seven sound banks of different size and regional 
provenance. The remaining three banks in the sample have been 
classified as 'bad' (Privredna Banka, Rijecka Banka, Splitska Banka). 
Figure 4 illustrates the unweighted average deposit interest rate and 
the unweighted standard deviation of deposit interest rates for all the 
banks in the sample. 
 
The standard deviation of deposit rates is low and, over time, more 
stable than the standard deviation of lending rates. This means a rather 
uniform business policy with respect to deposit rates. The deposit 
market is homogeneous and does not involve high transaction costs, so 
that depositors can easily transfer their deposits from one bank to 
another. Thus, the banks are forced to watch their deposit rates so that 
they do not depart from the interest offered by their competitors. 
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However, the loan market is segmented with high transaction costs, 





Contrary to expectations and widespread beliefs, the difference 
between two subsamples involved higher lending interest rates and 
higher margins in good banks. The result is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Group 1 includes bad, and Group 2 good banks. 
 
The explanation of this phenomenon is given in the second chapter. 
 
1.4  Interest Rates of the National Bank of Croatia (NBC)  
        and Interbank Money Market 
 
In financially developed economies the interest rates of the central 
bank mainly represent the top interest rate threshold in the money 
market. Their prohibitive magnitude provides for maximum efficiency in 
the allocation of monetary surpluses through the market, because 
banks try to avail themselves of all opportunities to acquire cheaper 
capital in the market before knocking on the expensive 'window' of the 
central bank. In Croatia the situation is the opposite. 'Knocking on the 
window' is relatively cheap. 
 
While the recent interest rate in the money market amounts to 23 to 24 
percent a year, the most important interest rates of the central bank 
are as follows: 18 percent on lombard (collateral) loans, 19 percent on 
intervention loans, and 17 percent on daily liquidity loans. The discount 
rate of 8.5 percent is used only in transactions with the government 
budget, which - in terms of opportunity cost- sustains the subsidizing of 
the budget by the central bank. 
 
To be sure, intervention loans granted to banks failing to cover a 
negative balance in the overnight money market are associated with 
penalties which increase the actual 'cost' of the intervention credit, but 
this cost is not excessive for desperate banks used to sanctions. On the 
other hand, the relatively low cost of lombard loans should be 
understood in terms of the fact that NBC bills have to be used as 
collateral when applying for such loans, and cost of the lombard credit 
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is therefore an indirect incentive to subscribe NBC bills bellow the 
market interest rate. However, such an incentive only contributes to the 
nontransparency of the system and slows down the development of the 
free auction market of NBC securities. 
 
Nevertheless, in September the NBC has begun to change its policy 
with respect to interest rates on NBC bills, thus bringing this instrument 
closerto market yardsticks, and this is encouraging. Having paid, for a 
long time, 18 percent on 35 days and 19.3 percent on 91 days, as of 
August 30 the interest on 35 days (which accounts for the majority of 
subscribed notes) was increased to 21.5 percent, and as of September 
4 to 22 percent. Although this is still short of market interest rate, the 
very low risk should also be taken into account. Hence the enhanced 
subscription of 'voluntary' notes in recent days. The fact is encouraging 
because this is the best sterilization instrument which places 
sterilization into the financial market context and does not affect the 
growth of interest rates. 
 
Other deposit NBC rates refer to two forms of the statutory reserve. A 
low interest rate of 5.5 percent a year is paid on 'traditional' statutory 
reserve assets, while 16.5 percent is paid on the financial relapse called 
'obligatory NBC bills.' 
 
The interest rate policy of the NBC influences the interest rates in the 
financial markets in two ways. On the lending interest rates side, 
interest is settled at lower rates as compared with the market and 
money is made available to the users of the financial services of the 
central bank at a relatively low cost, and this may reduce commercial 
banks' interest rates to a lower level as compared to what they would 
have been otherwise. On the deposit interest rates side, interest is 
settled at considerably lower rates as compared with the market; in 
conditions of extensive money sterilization, this increases the cost of 
financial intermediation and interest rates become higher as compared 
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to what they would have been otherwise. The net effect will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2. WHY ARE INTEREST RATES HIGH? 
 
There is a 'common sense' explanation: because there is not enough 
money. Money supply should be increased, and that will bring interest 
rates down and accelerate growth. 
 
At this point it would be worthwhile to recall Fernand Braudel's words: 
the essence of the progress of civilization lies in avoiding the pitfalls of 
'common sense. The obvious is not always true - the obvious may 
mean superficial. In this chapter we have tried to penetrate under the 
surface of the phenomena described in the first chapter and 
demonstrate that a 'common sense' explanation is too superficial to be 
translated into an efficient economic policy. 
 
For a start, Figure 6 illustrates the link between money supply, M1, and 
interest rates. It shows monthly data for the period from November 
1993 to August 1995. The reconstructed M1 series, which takes into 
account the establishment of the Treasury in October 1994, has been 
used. 
 
The data clearly show that there was a negative link (the growth of 
money supply reduced interest rates) until money supply crossed the 5 
billion kung threshold (which coincided more or less with the 
introduction of the kuna). After that the growth of money supply no 
longer influenced the reduction of interest. On the contrary, the very 
high growth of money supply, M1, in 1995 - 32.5 percent from late 
December 1994 to late August 1995 - has been associated with a 
considerable growth of interest rates. The following pages provide the 
answer to the question why the growth of money supply no longer has 





2.1. Trust, Money Supply Structure and Velocity 
 
The average lending interest rate of deposit money banks is about 22 
percent, and the average deposit interest rate about 4.5 percent. Short-
term deposits predominate, and the average kuna margin now amounts 
to the very high 17.5 percent. It has also been established that the 
level and structure of deposit interest is still insufficiently stimulative to 
attract higher savings. Although very high, deposit interest rate should 
be still higher. Accordingly, the lack of long-term, trust in the stability of 
the financial system and in currency still dictates the level of deposit 
interest, i.e., the basis for the determination of lending rates. Such a 
state of affairs will persist for some time to come, and it is not at all 
unusual for a young country which has experienced war and three 
decades of high inflation. 
 
Trust is closely associated with the degree of technical development of 
financial services and with the structure of money supply. The 
mentioned phenomena are of crucial importance when the links 
between the quantity and price of money are considered. That is, 
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taking into account the fact that money supply comprises cash and 
deposit money, the share of cash should always be borne in mind 
because cash is outside money which does not enter the process of 
multiplication (a higher propensity to hold cash reduces the money 
multiplier). In Croatia the propensity to hold cash because of the 
uncertainty and underdevelopment of the financial service industry (the 
use of automatic tellers has become widespread only in the past three 
years), and because of the high share of the shadow economy, is still 
very high. The average share of cash in money supply, M1, during the 
first six months of 1995 was 38 percent, matching the ratio attained by 
the United Kingdom and the United States on the eve of World War 
One. Accordingly, a substantial part of any increase of the money 
supply is drained outside the banking system, and a large part of 
money is still immobilized in private pockets. This is why the exogenous 
increase of money supply required for unit growth of loan supply is 
much higher in Croatia than the required increase in a more developed 
country, which also implies a much higher risk in providing loan supply 
incentives in this manner. Therefore, in this stage of development of 
the Croatian financial industry, the sources of funds should be sought in 
strengthening trust and stimulating competition, which will force banks 
to financial innovation and to increasing the money velocity. And that 
can only be achieved in conditions of stability. 
 
The meaning of the recommendation can be represented by Fisher's 
equation, MV = PY, or M/P = (1N)Y. If monetary policy relies on 
increasing money supply, M, there is the risk that nominal growth will 
be passed to price increase, P, and not to real income, Y, and that the 
financial industry will remain at a rudimentary stage of development. If 
a consistent stabilization policy is implemented, the system is forced to 
adjust naturally - the economy itself finds 'money' to the naturally 
required extent. Different financial innovations increase the velocity 
ratio, V. Since the nineteen-fifties, developed countries have doubled 
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the money velocity.3 The crucial role in the process has been played by 
the development of short-term financial markets, particularly markets 
involving different forms of bills and similar financial instruments. 
 
The foregoing warrants the following conclusion: the main cause 
underlying high interest rates lies in the lack of trust in the financial 
system and in currency, underdevelopment and noncompetitiveness of 
the financial industry, particularly of financial institutions, markets and 
instruments. 
 
2.2.  Difference Between Lending and Deposit  
         Interest Rates and Economic Growth 
 
The magnitude of deposit interest rates, correlated with the state of 
trust and the degree of development of financial markets, only 
determines the basis for lending interest rates. The actual lending 
interest rate also includes the margin, which depends on cost and 
competitiveness in the financial inter mediation sector, and which is 
exceptionally high in Croatia precisely because of the high cost and lack 
of competition. The extremely high difference between interest on 
foreign exchange loans and deposits - 13 percent in July - also bears 
witness to the fact that this particular factor is involved. 
 
The policy of sterilization of money supply surpluses does not have a 
crucial bearing on the margin. Even in 1994, when money supply more 
than doubled, when interest rates stabilized and when Croatia still had 
not signed the stand-by arrangement, the average margin level was 10-
12 percent, and this is a level which can also be seen in other countries 
which are successfully undergoing the period of socalled transition. This 
is also born out by the fact that Slovenia achieved in 1994 a growth of 
real GDP of 5 percent with an average real yearly interest on banking 
loans of 19.2 percent. 
                                                          
3 Farmer, Roger E.A. (1993): The Macroeconomics of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass: p. 214. 
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Therefore, this is an unfortunately unavoidable and general 
phenomenon in financial systems encumbered by the past, where 
banks have to pay almost all commitments from their liabilities, and can 
collect only a small part of claims from their assets. Sound banks, which 
achieve very high profits with a high margin, follow such a policy. They 
are still too small and organizationally too unstable to attract funds and 
offer loans at a lower cost by reducing the margin (by increasing 
deposit and reducing lending interest rates): the price elasticity of loan 
supply is very low. Hungarian experience has demonstrated that proper 
competition pressure can come only from foreign banks with a strong 
financial background and banking experience. 
 
Nevertheless, the following point is called for: if sound banks sustain a 
high margin, this implies that their clients belong to fast-growing 
segments of the economy. One should also and in particular remember 
the fact that sound banks have higher lending rates and margins than 
ailing banks. There are obviously clients operating in economic 
segments allowing for gross profits capable of withstanding the high 
cost of capital. Because of this, part of interest rate growth in the last 
trimester of 1994 should also be attributed to economic recovery, 
recorded at the time even by growth yardsticks of the poorest statistical 
quality (industrial output index). Moreover, the fact that bad banks 
have lower rates and margins should also be attributed to the fact that 
their poor clients are simply unable to pay higher interest. 
 
Conclusion: the second cause underlying high interest rates which has a 
direct bearing on the magnitude of the margin lies in the impossibility 
to recover old investments, which is why a smaller part of recoverable 
investments must entail higher interest if the banks are 
to meet their obligations. 
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2.3.  Role of the Budget and of the  
        Government Sector in General 
 
The analysis presented under 2.2 above focused on the links between 
the banking sector and other sectors without particularly singling out 
the government sector. However, that sector deserves a separate 
analysis because of its extremely important role. 
 
The link between government and the banking system is manifested in 
two basic ways - through links with the central bank and through links 
with deposit money banks. Links with the central bank involve loans to 
the government on the assets side and government deposits on the 
side of liabilities. The link on the liabilities side has become particularly 
important in recent times because the fluctuation of the government 
deposit balance with the NBC has a great bearing on total liquidity, i.e., 
on money supply. However, we have seen that money supply does not 
have a crucial bearing on the rate of interest, and we have just 
experienced - in August and September - its decisive bearing on the 
exchange rate. Therefore, outflow which is substantially higher than 
inflow to the government account has an effect contrary to what is 
expected: higher liquidity in the system does not bring interest rates 
down, but pushes the exchange rate towards depreciation. The NBC 
then sterilized the money supply surplus by its statutory reserve in 
order to stabilize the kung, and this pushed interest rates upward. The 
net effect is undesirable - growth of interest rates and of the margin. 
This is why at this moment fiscal policy prevails over monetary policy 
which, because of underdeveloped financial instruments and markets, 
has a very restricted maneuvering space. In the future the relation may 
change to the advantage of monetary policy, and to the benefit of fiscal 
and monetary subjects, if the sterilization instruments markets (the 
market of 'voluntary' notes, public debt market etc.) becomes stronger 
so that its volume and fluctuations exceed the average fluctuations in 
the government account with the NBC. And this is possible only by 
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allowing further growth of interest rates on NBC bills and if trade starts 
in accordance with transparency rules of free auction. 
 
The links between government and deposit money banks are so 
complex that this analysis can present only some of them, i.e., the links 
bearing on the magnitude and change of interest rates. Two relations 
are of the greatest importance. The first refers to 'old' banks a great 
part of whose assets are non-performing due to credits to state-owned 
enterprises awaiting rehabilitation, restructuring or bankruptcy, a.nd 
are not capable of repaying their loans. In such a situation of waiting 
there is no credible instrument for loan recovery, and the cost is 
transferred, in the form of higher interest rates, to clients capable of 
repaying loans. 
 
The magnitude of this problem is evinced by the paper entitled 'Analysis 
of the Financial Condition and Business Results of Croatian Banks 
According to Data for 1994' (National Bank of Croatia, Area for 
Supervision and Control). While the banks themselves classify only 5.68 
percent of their assets as 'bad', NBC supervision has shown, with 
respect to the data available to it, that at least 27 percent of the assets 
of deposit money banks should be classifified as 'bad'. The correction 
with respect to data provided by the banks refers to investments into 
some state-owned enterprises. But even this is a very optimistic 
estimate because only 0.71 percent of securities, accounting for as 
many as 43.2 percent of totally classified assets, have been classified as 
bad. These are mostly securities taken over through the transformation 
of debt into equity, and a great part of these securities produces no 
yield because the enterprises pay no dividend, and can be sold in the 
market far below their nominal value, if at all. Hence the justified doubt 
that the share of bad non-performing assets in the five largest banks 
might be, very roughly, between 50-60 and 70-75 percent. According to 
data available to the NBC (cumulative with corrections by the banks), 
the very unfavourable breakdown of risky but good assets bears 




Furthermore, the absence of a credible debt collection system increases 
the risk of financial operation throughout the system, i.e., in its sound 
part as well. There is always the danger that a client might keep funds 
in circulation for his own account if this gives him a higher yield as 
compared to the total loan cost, penalties included. This gives rise to 
unpermissible and irregular arbitrage which incorporates a higher 
degree of risk perception into the average cost of financial  
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intermediation. It should be stressed that no data are available in this 
regard, and that this discussion remains at the level of speculation. 
 
At any rate, risk is becoming an increasingly important element of the 
cost of money and large banks, which still operate with a vague and 
still predominantly (indirectly, through enterprises) state ownership 
structure, cannot adequately valuate risk. Because of this their present 
business policy does not lead to a solution of the problem. On the other 
hand, the process of rehabilitation which should help them in this 
regard obviously lags behind. 
 
Risk in the financial intermediation system is additionally increased by 
unresolved relations regarding public debt servicing. The budget runs a 
nontransparent public debt policy, i.e., does not provide the funds 
required for the servicing of due interest and principal. Because of this 
the net claims of the banking system on government have increased 
this year by almost 800 million kuna by the end of August, and an 
agreement on the payment of the total debt, although promised, has 
not been concluded yet.4 The fate of the new instalment, which also 
includes part of the principal and becomes due at the end of the year, 
is also uncertain. In this light it may be of interest to note that claims 
on government on account of public debt are classified as risky but 
good assets, and this makes the assessment about only 30 percent of 
poor assets additionally questionable. 
 
2.4.  Money Sterilization Policy and Link Between  
        Foreign Exchange and Kuna Loan Markets 
 
Therefore, only a smaller part of the interest rate magnitude, i.e., the 
change of magnitude.over the past four months, is left unexplained. 
About 5 percent of growth are involved, which is not by any means a 
small figure. Most of this growth is caused by the increase of the 
opportunity and absolute cost of financial mediation due to the higher 
                                                          
4 End of August. 
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rate of the statutory reserve and the introduction of obligatory NBC 
bills. Although it is not difficult to be a hero now, after the battle, and 
claim that additional sterilization was unnecessary, we firmly believe 
that sterilization was a reasonable policy (in principle, without entering 
into the choice of instruments). The latest developments in the Croatian 
foreign exchange market only reinforce this conviction. 
 
First, it should be stated that it would be impossible to defend the claim 
according to which the growth of interest rates had a bearing on 
slowing down growth. The growth momentum of the latter half of 1994 
disappeared after the first quarter of 1995, mainly under the influence 
of political-war reasons: the January termination of the UNPROFOR 
mandate, the feeling about the imminent outcome of the crisis, 
operations 'Flash', 'Summer 95' and 'Storm', naturally slowed down 
economic flows, particularly the further increase of exports. Moreover, 
macroeconomic policy could no longer promote growth on its own as in 
1994. Because of the absence of microeconomic reforms, most of the 
increased domestic aggregate demand began to shift to imported 
products, with the resulting deficit in the current account of the balance 
of payments. 
 
Second, for all that, the receipts from tourist and attendant services 
achieved in June and July were not negligible. The higher seasonal 
foreign exchange inflow prompted the NBC to enhance purchase (also 
motivated to a considerable extent by the correction of the criteria 
regarding international reserves of the central bank for arrears due to 
the Paris Club); thus, there was a surplus money supply in financial 
channels in late July. In August the surplus produced an equilibrium in 
the foreign exchange market at a new level of the kung rate of 
exchange depreciated by 1.2 percent. Therefore, the link between 
money supply and interest rates should be considered in conjunction 
with the response of the foreign exchange market. 
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Conclusion: the third cause of high interest rates occurs because of the 
existence of a trade-off between the maintenance of the exchange rate 
and of prices on the one hand, and the reduction of interest rates on 
the other. Over a short term, stability should be sacrificed to the 
advantage of interest rate reduction, while the disruption of stability in 
the long run makes the resolution of the first two main causes of high 
interest rates less possible. It would therefore be wiser to sacrifice high 
interest rates in the short run in order to deal with the long-term, 
structural causes of high interest rates. 
 
3.  CONCLUSION: HOW TO BRING DOWN INTEREST RATES  
                               IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA? 
 
Like any treatment, economic policy can be successful only if based on 
a correct diagnosis. If the diagnosis is wrong, the disease gets worse. 
Let us examine first the course of the disease brought about by a 
wrong diagnosis. 
 
Wrong diagnosis: the resources of the national economy are not 
utilized because of high real interest rates, i.e., because of the lack of 
loan (money) supply. 
 
Treatment: increase the money supply. 
 
Course of disease: the economy enters into a stage of excess 
aggregate demand associated with the depreciation of the exchange 
rate. In theoretical terms, at first excess demand can even produce 
some growth of the real output, but part of the surplus shifts to price 
growth. A higher depreciation of the exchange rate first increases the 
cost of strategically important import inputs (oil!) and formally or 
informally indexed prices, and the price domino effect begins to spread 
in the economy. Nominal deposit rates cannot be increased to the 
extent required to offset the initial price growth, and the rationale for 
keeping money in accounts decreases. Real deposit money declines, 
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and every motive for spreading financial innovation disappears. Net loss 
is achieved with cash, the share of which in the money supply is high 
and increasing additionally because of the inability of banks to increase 
real deposit rates and hold deposits. However, everybody wants to 
protect the value of his or her wealth. Since trust has again been 
flouted, kuna cash does not 'run away' to goods and real estate but, 
first and foremost, to foreign exchange (because of the low standard of 
living and of the collective memory of the instability period), creating 
new pressure on the exchange rate and a new price increase cycle, etc. 
The final outcome: the destruction of the most valuable form of 
economic capital - the reputation and trust capital; stagnation and 
recession appear again. In such conditions it is not possible to increase 
real output by promoting domestic aggregate demand, because the 
part of increased demand which does not shift to imported products is 
mainly shifted to demand for instruments protecting the value of real 
wealth such as the Deutschmark. Although real interest rates would 
decline in this scenario, this decline would not be associated with stable 
growth. 
 
The essence of the error is to be found in the unidimensional, 
superficial diagnosis - in the 'common sense' error. Unidimensional 
simplicity also results in a superficial drug. 
 
Correct diagnosis: there are several causes of the disease. Let us list 
them in the order of their importance: 
 
1. Long-term distrust in the system and in currency, and deposit 
interest rates which are still insufficiently high, in real terms, in 
order to overcome the perception of risk. 
2. Underdevelopment of the financial industry manifested through  
a) the high share of cash in money supply; 
           b) the underdevelopment of short-term financial markets and  
               instruments. 
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3. The past, reflected in non-performing bank assets producing no 
yield, so that banks can operate only with high differences 
between lending and deposit interest rates. 
4. Low intensity competition in the banking sector and absence of 
foreign banks. 
5. Sterilization of money supply surpluses which could cause 




1. Link the growth of money supply to the exchange rate; permit 
increases only if there is appreciation pressure and, in that 
case, combine the growth of money supply and appreciation in 
order to reduce the problems of ex post sterilization. 
2. In that case, issue money linearly, by reducing the statutory 
reserve, and not selectively through intervention in the foreign 
exchange market; this will promote the development of the 
interbank foreign exchange and kuna markets, the exchange 
rate will assume equilibrium price features, the problems 
caused by selective issue and linear ex post sterilization will be 
reduced, and all the NBC has to do is to renounce international 
reserve maximizing as its target function. 
3. Moreover, in implementing such a policy the NBC has to 
increase its lending and deposit rates; rates on loans should be 
increased above the rates in the money market, and interest 
rates on NBC bills should be determined in accordance with 
transparent auction rules. The price in the overnight money 
market should be liberalized completely, and the repayment of 
overnight loans from secondary liquidity sources should be 
forbidden. 
4. The target function consistent with interest rate abatement is 
the zero course of NBC profit, even if that meant a perceptible 
growth of interest paid on statutory reserve assets and other 
reserve money; this contributes to the 'rehabilitation' of the 
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banking system in a transparent way and with the maximum 
appreciation of market criteria, as well as with the reduction of 
pressure with respect to arbitrary administrative criteria. In this 
model the short-term loser is the government budget which is 
deprived of the not insignificant seigniorage, but even the 
budget stands to gain in the long run because the model 
reduces the funds to be provided for rehabilitation, and it also 
reduces the administrative pressure on the Agency which will 
not, for a forseeable period, have the administrative facilities 
for a successful implementation of the complex operation of 
rehabilitation; most important of all, the reduction of interest 
rates makes the development of the public debt market 
possible. 
5. Items 1-4 are related to the behaviour of the monetary 
authorities. However, the central bank cannot contribute to the 
final stabilization of interest rates on its own. A balanced 
budget policy and a faster implemention of microeconomic 
reforms are required. 
 
In this way interest rates would be brought down in conditions of stable 
exchange rate and prices, these being the most important preconditions 
for the long-term solution of the problem. The problem is dealt with by 
reliance on the strengthening of trust in the system and currency, by 
financial market development, by reinforcement of competitive, natural 
pressures on bank restructuring, by promoting financial innovation, and 
by the opening of the Croatian financial system and economy as a 
whole. 
